

Causal Inference: prediction, explanation, and intervention

Lecture 3: Probabilistic causality
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Why probabilistic causality?

- Non-deterministic relationships
 - Radioactive decay
- Incomplete knowledge
 - Even if food poisoning were deterministic, we still would not know all the conditions needed to bring it about
- Capture *how much* of a difference cause makes to effect
 - Difference between oxygen and lit match for house fire

Quick probability review

- Sample space: set of all possible outcomes
- Event: subset of the sample space

- Flipping a coin twice in row
 - $\Omega = \{HH, HT, TH, TT\}$
 - Event of getting exactly one tail $\{HT, TH\}$

Probability function

- For A being subsets of Ω
 - $P(A) \in [0, 1]$, for A in set of events
 - $P(\Omega) = 1$
 - For disjoint events A, B : $P(A \vee B) = P(A) + P(B)$
- $\Omega = \{HH, HT, TH, TT\}$
- P any combination of heads/tails = 1
- $P(HH \vee TT) = 1/2$

Probabilities from data

How to determine probability of heads/tails from coin flip?


- Frequency of event x
 - $\#(x)$ = number of times it is observed
- Relative frequency
 - $\#(x)/N$, where N is number of observations
- As $N \rightarrow \infty$, relative frequency $\rightarrow P(x)$

Probabilities from data - challenges

- Sampling bias
 - E.g. survey FOX news or MSNBC viewers about president
- Confirmation bias
 - Ignoring some events
 - Coding events differently

Disjunction


- Addition rule
 - $P(A \vee B) = P(A) + P(B) - P(A \wedge B)$
- Mutually exclusive events
 - $P(A \vee B) = P(A) + P(B)$
 - Flipping $H \vee T$ versus increasing unemployment or decreasing interest rates



Complement rule

$$1 = P(A) + P(\neg A)$$

$$P(\neg A) = 1 - P(A)$$




Dependence/independence

- Events that are independent
 - Flipping heads and then tails
 - Day of week and whether a patient had a heart attack (probably?)
- Events that are dependent
 - Vice presidential candidate and presidential nominee
 - Diagnostic test being positive and whether patient has a disease

Conjunction

- For independent events

$$P(A \wedge B) = P(A)P(B)$$



Conditional probability

$$P(A \wedge B) = P(A|B)P(B), \text{ where } P(B) > 0$$


Note, if A and B independent, $P(A \wedge B) = P(A)P(B)$

$$\text{Then: } P(A|B) = \frac{P(A)P(B)}{P(B)} = P(A)$$

Law of total probability

$$\begin{aligned} P(A) &= P(A \wedge B_1) + P(A \wedge B_2) + \dots + P(A \wedge B_n) \\ &= P(A|B_1)P(B_1) + P(A|B_2)P(B_2) + \dots + P(A|B_n)P(B_n) \\ &= \sum_{i=1}^n P(A|B_i)P(B_i) \end{aligned}$$

Also called
marginal
probability,
and this
process is
marginalization



Bayes rule

$$P(A|B) = \frac{P(A \wedge B)}{P(B)}$$

$$P(A \wedge B) = P(A|B)P(B) = P(B|A)P(A)$$

$$P(A|B) = \frac{P(B|A)P(A)}{P(B)}$$

Example of Bayes rule

- Probability of disease (d) is 0.001
- But diagnostic test not foolproof
 - $P(+|d) = 0.98$
 - $P(+|\neg d) = 0.1$

Given a positive test, what's probability patient has disease?

Example continued

$$P(d|+) = \frac{P(+|d)P(d)}{p(+)}$$

$$P(\neg d) = 1 - P(d)$$

$$= \frac{P(+|d)P(d)}{P(+|d)P(d) + P(+|\neg d)P(\neg d)}$$

$$= \frac{0.98 \times 0.001}{0.98 \times 0.001 + 0.1 \times (1 - 0.001)}$$

$$= \frac{0.00098}{0.10088} \approx 0.01$$


Probabilistic causality: basic idea

C causes E if

$$P(E|C) > P(E)$$

Or $P(E|C) > P(E|\neg C)$

Probability raising and common causes



Screening off

How to weed out non-causes that raise probability

- Yellowed fingers and lung cancer
- Falling barometer and rain

C screens off A from B if

$$P(B|A \wedge C) = P(B|C)$$

Screening off and causal chains

Disease \rightarrow medication \rightarrow side effect

$$P(S|M,D)=P(S|M)$$

Common cause principle

C is common cause of A and B if C is earlier than both and:

1. $P(A \wedge B|C) = P(A|C)P(B|C)$
2. $P(A \wedge B|\neg C) = P(A|\neg C)P(B|\neg C)$
3. $P(A|C) > P(A|\neg C)$
4. $P(B|C) > P(B|\neg C)$

Reichenbach

If C and E are dependent either C causes E, E causes C or they have a common cause (that is earlier than both) that screens them off from one another

Problem: no single common cause



Alice and Bob both like to take AI (i) classes that meet in the afternoon (t), so they're likely to be in the same classes

$$P(A|B) > P(A)$$

$$P(A|B \wedge i) > P(A|i)$$

$$P(A|B \wedge t) > P(A|t)$$


Problem: Nonstationarity



Sober, E. (2001). Venetian sea levels, British bread prices, and the principle of the common cause. *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, 52(2),

Problem: Indeterminism

If lamp on, tv also on, so $P(L|T)=1$



Does switch screen off L and T?

Suppes


- Causes raise probability of their effects
- Causes are temporally prior to their effects

How can we identify spurious causes?

Prima facie causes

C is a **prima facie cause** of E iff:

- C is earlier than E
- $P(C) > 0$
- $P(E|C) > P(E)$



Spurious causes


- Many non-causal correlations
- Main idea: finding things earlier than prima facie cause that account equally well for effect

Spurious

C is a **spurious cause** of E iff:

- C is prima facie cause of E
- Exists S earlier than C such that:
 - $P(C,S) > 0$
 - $P(E|C,S) = P(E|S)$
 - $P(E|C,S) \geq P(E|C)$

Decreasing air pressure



Why is this insufficient?

Cause is spurious if

1. We have an event that eliminates cause's effectiveness for predicting the effect
2. S is at least as good a predictor of effect as cause alone

Genuine causes

- A prima facie cause that is not spurious is genuine


ε -spurious

- Before, $P(A|B,C)=P(A|C)$
- What if not exactly =, but still small effect?
- B is ε -spurious cause of A iff:
 - Same conditions as before, but:
 - $|P(A|B,C)-P(A|C)| < \varepsilon$

Difficulties with
probabilistic causality?


Problem: Causal chain

- Each element in chain produces next with $P=1$
- What happens?
- Each element spurious aside from first – always an earlier cause to account for effect




Problem: Overdetermination

- Bob and Susie throwing rocks at glass bottle
- Rocks hit simultaneously, but Susie threw first




Problem: Preemption


- Bob's rock arrives first and breaks glass
- But Susie still threw first and has perfect aim (breaks glass with $P=1$)




Problem: effect size




(a) Probability .1



(b) Probability .2



(c) Probability .0000001



(d) Probability .0000002

Journal club: today's paper

Eells

- Instead of single event making something spurious, average over contexts
- Separated type/token
 - Probability in general \neq probability in single case

Background contexts

- Holding fixed other factors, does cause still raise probability of effect?
- Idea is to hold fixed everything relevant to the effect that's not caused by C

Causal background contexts

- n factors relevant to E independently of C
- $K=2^n$ ways of holding these factors fixed
- Background contexts are K_i 's such that:
 - $P(K_i \wedge C) > 0$
 - $P(K_i \wedge \neg C) > 0$

E.g. factors A, B, C , one $K_i = \{A, \neg B, C\}$

Comparison to Suppes

- Suppes factors: earlier than prima facie cause
- Eells: factors earlier than effect, not caused by cause

Context unanimity

- For C to be positive cause, must raise probability of E with respect to **every** background context
 - $P(E|C \wedge K_i) > P(E|\neg C \wedge K_i)$ for all K_i
- Can't lower probability or remain same
- What about medications with rare side effects?

Four types of causal factors

Note: all relative to population

1. Positive

$$P(E|C \wedge K_i) > P(E|\neg C \wedge K_i) \text{ for all } K_i$$

2. Negative

$$P(E|C \wedge K_i) < P(E|\neg C \wedge K_i) \text{ for all } K_i$$

3. Neutral

$$P(E|C \wedge K_i) = P(E|\neg C \wedge K_i) \text{ for all } K_i$$

4. Mixed

Neither positive, negative, or neutral

Strength of relationship

- Not just relevant/not relevant, but how relevant
- Weed out factors that are always positively relevant, but make small difference to probability
- Average degree of causal significance

$$\sum_i [P(E|C \wedge K_i) - P(E|\neg C \wedge K_i)]P(K_i)$$

Example

- To assess whether smoking causes lung cancer, would hold fixed perhaps genetic factors (G), and asbestos exposure (A)
 - Both relevant to LC but independent of S
- Test whether $P(\text{LC})$ raised by S in each context $\{A \wedge G, A \wedge \neg G, \neg A \wedge G, \neg A \wedge \neg G\}$

Difficulties


- Circular
 - Need to hold fixed causally relevant factors...
to figure out if something is causally relevant
- Indirect
 - What happens in a causal chain? (not holding
fixed other effects of cause)

Token causality


- Difference between $P(LC|S)$ for individual and population
- Timing: lit match and house fire today versus match lit weeks ago
- Differing roles: Positive causes at type level may be negative at token level

Eells on token causality

- Type and token are distinct
- Look at how probability changes over time after cause
- Can distinguish between probability in general and probability on specific occasion
 - Note: this lets us update explanation to be consistent with observation



Probability trajectory



Ways of answering “why”?

Not just caused/didn't cause, but what was role of cause in effect's occurrence?

Anne drives drunk and crashes car. What's significance of her drinking for the crash?

Could be

- Because of
- Despite
- Independently of

y is because of x if

- $P(y)$ changes after x
- $P(y)$ is high after x
- $P(y)$ is higher than it was before x
- $P(y)$ remains high until it occurs

Four relations

Despite

- y is Y despite x if the probability of Y is lowered after x_t ,

Because

- y is Y because of x if the probability of Y is increased after x_t and remains increased until y_t

Autonomously

- y is Y autonomously of x if the probability of Y changes at x_t , this probability is high, but then decreases before y_t

Independently

- y is Y independently of x if the probability of Y is the same just after x_t as it is just before x_t ,

Poison and antidote

$P(D|O)=0.8$ in 30 minutes


$P(D|A \wedge O)=0.001$ if within 10 minutes of O

$P(D|A \wedge \neg O)=0.001$

Are A and O positive, negative, neutral or mixed? Better handled by Suppes or Eells?

Can impact on a specific instance be different than that at type level? When?

Poison and antidote



Why are background contexts needed?

- What if poison and antidote are administered at same time?
- What about exposure that provides resistance to later bacteria?

More generally

- Need to account for temporally intermediate factors that affect outcome – independently of the cause
- Want to focus on impact of cause on probability, separating it from impact of other factor

Background factors

- Not relevant
 - Things caused by cause
 - Golf ball's motion near cup
- Relevant
 - Factors interacting with cause, or causes of effect (not caused by cause)
 - Radon exposure for lung cancer

Token causal relevance

x is relevant to y if it happened either because of or despite x , after holding fixed two sets of factors

1. Factors that occur, are not token caused by x being X and are type-level causally relevant to y 's being Y holding fixed how things are before these factors actually occur.
2. Factors that token occur in the particular case, are not token caused by x being X and that interact with X with respect to Y holding fixed what is actually true before x_t .

Caveats

- How can we know all the important factors?
- How can we find the probability trajectory?

Another approach

- Strength of relationship at token level proportional to that at type level
 - Radiation exposure and death / Marie Curie's radiation exposure causing her death
- Something is a type-level cause because it's often a token cause
 - If poison is fatal with $P=0.8$, have good reason to believe that when someone is poisoned and dies, this is another instance of death by poison

Connecting principle

If C is a causal factor for producing E in population P of magnitude m , then the support for the hypothesis that C at time t_1 caused E at time t_2 given that they both token occur in P at these times is m .

Connecting principle

- C and E are types of events, but occur at specific times/places

$$m = \sum_i [P(E | C \wedge K_i) - P(E | \neg C \wedge K_i)] P(K_i)$$

- $S(c \text{ caused } e | c, e \text{ occur in } P) = m$

But what population?

- Sober: most specific
 - In explaining illness, if we know age/weight, the population is people with those characteristics
 - If only know gender, population is all men or women
- In practice..
 - Never have arbitrarily specific data
 - Would uniquely specify an individual if taken to extremes

Also...

- What if we do not know cause happened for certain?
- What about timing?

Recap of first section

- Main approaches
 - Regularities
 - Counterfactuals
 - Probabilistic causality
 - Omitted: interventionist
- Two problems
 - Type level
 - Token level

Looking forward

- Next few weeks
 - Graphical models
 - Bayes nets, DBNs
 - Granger causality
 - Other computational methods
- Then
 - Experiment design, applications

For next time...

Be sure to read discussion paper!